* finally wire up "application versions"
* remove when_verifier (which used to fire after key establishment, but
before the VERSION message was received or verified)
* fire when_verified and when_version at the same time (after VERSION is
verified), but with different args
(one displayed message per received welcome["motd"])
There's not much value in prohibiting the server from sending multiple
MOTD messages, and it would prevent us from using it to display a "your
client is using an old API, please upgrade" message after having already
sent a regular "please donate" MOTD message. (We could send a second
welcome message with ["error"] to kill the client, but ["motd"] is the
most convenient way to deliver a non-fatal warning).
The reasoning is that this string is only ever likely to refer to the
version of the primary/initial client (the CLI application, written in
Python, that you get with "pip install magic-wormhole"). When there are
other implementations, with unrelated versions, they should obviously
not pay attention to a warning about the other implementation being out
of date.
This gives us room in the future to put other keys there, like one which
says we want to use Noise for the phase-message encryption instead of
our current HKDF scheme.
This better reflects the purpose of the message. Key confirmation is a
side-effect.
This patch only changes the "phase:" name and the key-derivation string.
A subsequent patch will modify the function and variable names to match.
Previously the encryption key used for "phase messages" (anything sent
from one side to the other, protected by the shared PAKE-generated
session key) was derived just from the session key and the phase name.
The two sides would use the same key for their first message (but with
random, thus different, nonces).
This uses the sending side's string (a random 5-byte/10-character hex
string) in the derivation process too, so the two sides use different
keys. This gives us an easy way to reject reflected messages. We already
ignore messages that claim to use a "side" which matches our own (to
ignore server echoes of our own outbound messages). With this change, an
attacker (or the server) can't swap in the payload of an outbound
message, change the "side" to make it look like a peer message, and then
let us decrypt it correctly.
It also changes the derivation function to combine the phase and side
values safely. This didn't matter much when we only had one
externally-provided string, but with two, there's an opportunity for
format confusion if they were combined with a simple delimiter. Now we
hash both values before concatenating them.
This breaks interoperability with clients from before this change. They
will always get WrongPasswordErrors.
* add "released" ack-response for "release" command, to sync w.close()
* move websocket URL to root
* relayurl= should now be a "ws://" URL
* many tests pass (except for test_twisted, which will be removed, and
test_scripts)
* still moving integration tests from test_twisted to
test_wormhole.Wormholes
