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Labor, Capital, and the Optimal Growth of Social Movements

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September 22, 2020

WORK IN PROGRESS

1 Introduction

Social movements such as “Effective Altruism” face the problem of optimal allocation of resources across time in order to maximize their desired impact. Much like states and other entities considered in the literature since (Ramsey, 1928) [1], they have the option to invest in order to give more later. However, unlike states, where population dynamics are usually considered exogenous, such agents also have the option of recruiting like-minded associates through movement building. For example, Bill Gates can recruit other ultra-rich people through the Giving Pledge, aspiring effective altruists can likewise spread their ideas, etc.

This paper models the optimal allocation of capital for a social movement between direct spending, investment, and movement building, as well as the optimal allocation of labor between direct workers, money earners, and movement builders. This research direction follows in the footsteps of (Trammell, 2020) [2], which considers a different facet of a related problem: the dynamics for a philanthropic funder who aims to provide public goods while having a lower discount rate than less patient partners.

The outline of this paper is as follows: §?? presents the mathematical toolset and nomenclature used to find solutions for the optimal path problems, namely the Hamiltonian.

§2 considers a social movement which starts out with a certain amount of money and a certain number of movement participants. This movement

must then decide where to allocate their capital and labor. We work out some useful properties of the optimal solution, as well as its long-term balanced growth rates.

§3 outlines some results which allow for the numerical simulation of the evolution of the model starting from some initial conditions, and provides some analysis and graphical results. §4 outlines implications and conclusions.

2 Movement building model

2.1 Setup

The variables under consideration are:

1. x_1 , total capital, and x_2 , total movement size (labor). r_1 , the return rate on capital, and r_2 , which will typically be negative and represent a decay rate, due to death, value drift, etc.
2. α_1 , spending on direct work on a given instant, and α_2 , the money spent on movement building on a given instant.
3. $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3$: the fraction of labor which works respectively on direct work, movement building, and money-making. $\sigma_1 + \sigma_2 + \sigma_3 = 1$, so well substitute $\sigma_3 = 1 - \sigma_1 - \sigma_2$ throughout.
4. $w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}$: wages rising with economic growth, and $\beta_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_2 t\}$: the changing difficulty of recruiting movement participants. γ_2 might be hypothesized to be negative, given that economic growth provides better outside options, but empirically seems to be positive. For simplicity, we will consider these rates $-\gamma_1$ and γ_2 — to be exogenous.
5. δ_2 : movement building returns to scale

We are maximizing:

$$V(\alpha(\vec{t})) = \max_{\alpha(\vec{t})} \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \cdot U(x(\vec{t}), \alpha(\vec{t})) dt \quad (1)$$

For utility and laws of motion:

$$U(x, \alpha) = \frac{(\alpha_1^{\lambda_1} (\sigma_1 x_2)^{1-\lambda_1})^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} \quad (2)$$

$$\dot{x} = \begin{bmatrix} \dot{x}_1 \\ \dot{x}_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} r_1 x_1 - \alpha_1 - \alpha_2 + x_2 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\} \cdot (1 - \sigma_1 - \sigma_2) \\ r_2 x_2 + \beta_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_2 t\} \cdot (\alpha_2^{\lambda_2} \cdot (\sigma_2 x_2)^{1-\lambda_2})^{\delta_2} \end{bmatrix} \quad (3)$$

under the constraints that

$$x_2 \geq 0 \wedge \alpha_i \geq 0 \wedge \sigma_1 + \sigma_2 \leq 1 \quad (4)$$

With the Hamiltonian standing at:

$$H = U + \mu_1 \cdot \dot{x}_1 + \mu_2 \cdot \dot{x}_2 \quad (5)$$

$$\begin{aligned} H = & \frac{(\alpha_1^{\lambda_1} (\sigma_1 x_2)^{1-\lambda_1})^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} \\ & + \mu_1 \cdot (r_1 x_1 - \alpha_1 - \alpha_2 + x_2 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\} \cdot (1 - \sigma_1 - \sigma_2)) \\ & + \mu_2 \cdot (r_2 x_2 + \beta_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_2 t\} \cdot (\alpha_2^{\lambda_2} \cdot (\sigma_2 x_2)^{1-\lambda_2})^{\delta_2}) \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

and the transversality condition being:

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \exp\{-\rho \cdot t\} \cdot x_i \cdot \mu_i = 0 \quad (7)$$

For convenience, $F_2 := \beta_2 \cdot (\alpha_2^{\lambda_2} \cdot (\sigma_2 x_2)^{1-\lambda_2})^{\delta_2}$. Note that $F_2 = \dot{x}_2 - r_2 x_2$

2.2 Variable ratios heuristic

Theorem 1. *Let the model described in (2.1) hold. Then, in the optimal path,*

$$\frac{(1 - \lambda_1)}{\lambda_1} \cdot \frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma_1} = \frac{(1 - \lambda_2)}{\lambda_2} \cdot \frac{\alpha_2}{\sigma_2} \quad (8)$$

We will provide two proofs, one using the derivation from an analysis of the Hamiltonian equations in §B, and another which considers the marginal values of these variables.

Proof (from analysis of the Hamiltonian equations in §B). By dividing (72) by (74) and (73) by (75), we conclude that:

$$\frac{\lambda_1}{\alpha_1} = \frac{1 - \lambda_1}{\sigma_1 \cdot x_2 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \quad (9)$$

$$\frac{\lambda_2}{\alpha_2} = \frac{1 - \lambda_2}{\sigma_2 \cdot x_2 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \quad (10)$$

and hence

$$\frac{(1 - \lambda_1)}{\lambda_1} \cdot \frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma_1} = \frac{(1 - \lambda_2)}{\lambda_2} \cdot \frac{\alpha_2}{\sigma_2} \quad (11)$$

□

We can also derive this result from the Euler equations, that is, just from the constraint that on the optimal path, the marginal value of moving labor and spending around should be equal to 0.

Proof (using the Euler equations).

$$\frac{\partial U}{\partial \$} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial labor} \cdot \frac{\partial labor}{\partial \$ \text{ bought out of money-making}} \quad (12)$$

$$\frac{\partial \text{people}}{\partial \$ \text{ through movement building}} = \frac{\partial labor}{\partial labor} \cdot \frac{\partial labor}{\partial \$ \text{ bought out of money-making}} \quad (13)$$

Equation (12) reads as “the *marginal* money-maker should produce as much value by making money and directly donating their earnings as by working directly.” Equation (13) reads as “the *marginal* money-maker should create as many movement participants by making money and donating their earnings to movement building as by working on movement building themselves.” Otherwise, we could move direct workers or movement builders towards money-making, or vice-versa.

From (3) and (5), the model definition, these two equations develop into:

$$\lambda_1 \cdot (1 - \eta) \cdot \frac{U}{\alpha_1} = \left((1 - \lambda_1) \cdot (1 - \eta) \cdot \frac{U}{\sigma_1 \cdot x_2} \right) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 \cdot t\}} \right) \quad (14)$$

$$\lambda_2 \cdot \delta_2 \cdot \frac{F_2}{\alpha_2} = \left((1 - \lambda_2) \cdot \delta_2 \cdot \frac{F_2}{\sigma_2 \cdot x_2} \right) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 \cdot t\}} \right) \quad (15)$$

Which simplify into

$$\frac{\lambda_1}{\alpha_1} = \frac{1 - \lambda_1}{\sigma_1 \cdot x_2 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \quad (16)$$

$$\frac{\lambda_2}{\alpha_2} = \frac{1 - \lambda_2}{\sigma_2 \cdot x_2 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \quad (17)$$

i.e., (9) and (10), from which (8) follows by isolation of the $x_2 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}$ term:

$$\frac{(1 - \lambda_1)}{\lambda_1} \cdot \frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma_1} = \frac{(1 - \lambda_2)}{\lambda_2} \cdot \frac{\alpha_2}{\sigma_2} \quad (18)$$

□

We can understand this equation as a convenient necessary but not sufficient heuristic, such that a spending schedule which doesn't satisfy it suffers from the affliction that, insofar as the model under consideration is accurate enough, one would be able to obtain a better outcome by redistributing people and funds around.

This heuristic can also be expressed in even simpler terms by abstracting the λ_i away:

$$\frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma_1} \cdot = \text{constant} \cdot \frac{\alpha_2}{\sigma_2} \quad (19)$$

respectively

$$\frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma_1 \cdot x_2} \cdot = \text{constant} \cdot \frac{\alpha_2}{\sigma_2 \cdot x_2} \quad (20)$$

2.3 Results

2.3.1 Balanced growth rates

The balanced growth rates for our variables are derived in §§B.1 through B.4. They are :

$$g_{x_2} = \frac{\gamma_2 + \delta_2 \lambda_2 \gamma_1}{1 - \delta_2} \quad (21)$$

$$g_{\alpha_2} = g_{x_2} + \gamma_1 = \left[\frac{\gamma_2 + \delta_2 \lambda_2 \gamma_1}{1 - \delta_2} \right] + \gamma_1 \quad (22)$$

$$g_{\sigma_2} = 0 \quad (23)$$

$$g_{\alpha_1} = \frac{r_1 - \rho}{\eta} - \frac{(1 - \eta)(1 - \lambda_1)}{\eta} \cdot \gamma_1 \quad (24)$$

$$g_{\sigma_1} = \frac{r - \rho}{\eta} - \left(\frac{(1 - \eta)(1 - \lambda_1)}{\eta} + 1 \right) \cdot \gamma_1 - g_{x_2} \quad (25)$$

subject to the transversality conditions:

$$\begin{cases} g_{\alpha_1} < r_1 \\ g_{\alpha_2} < r_1 \\ r_2 + \gamma_1 < r_1 \end{cases} \quad (26)$$

2.3.2 Asymptotic Quasi-Ponzi

Theorem 2. *Let the model described in (2.1) hold. Then, in the optimal path, in almost all cases:*

$$\frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_1 + \sigma_2} \rightarrow 0 \quad (27)$$

$$\frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2} \rightarrow 0 \quad (28)$$

Proof. Recall (8):

$$\frac{(1 - \lambda_1)}{\lambda_1} \cdot \frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma_1} = \frac{(1 - \lambda_2)}{\lambda_2} \cdot \frac{\alpha_2}{\sigma_2} \quad (29)$$

Per results on the previous section, (2.3.1), $g_{\sigma_2} = 0$. Further, we know that $g_{\sigma_1} \leq 0$; it can't be the case that $g_{\sigma_1} > 0$ because then σ_1 , the fraction of movement building allocated to direct work would eventually exceed 100%.

In particular, $g_{\sigma_1} < 0$ unless we're on the knife edge case where

$$\frac{r - \rho}{\eta} - \left(\frac{(1 - \eta)(1 - \lambda_1)}{\eta} + 1 \right) \cdot \gamma_1 = \frac{\gamma_2 + \delta_2 \lambda_2 \gamma_1}{1 - \delta_2} \quad (30)$$

So, unless σ_1 is on that knife edge case, $\sigma_1 \rightarrow 0$ and because σ_2 converges to a nonzero constant in almost all cases:

$$\frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_1 + \sigma_2} \rightarrow 0 \quad (31)$$

Per (8), $g_{\alpha_2} - g_{\sigma_2} = g_{\alpha_1} - g_{\sigma_1}$, and because $g_{\sigma_1} < 0$ in almost all cases, $g_{\alpha_2} > g_{\alpha_1}$. Because α_2 then grows faster than α_1 , this directly implies:

$$\frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2} \rightarrow 0 \quad (32)$$

□

This is reminiscent of a Ponzi scheme or of a multi-level-marketing scheme, because in the limit, most participants don't do direct-work either. In section §3 we will notice that this behavior may hold in the limit, but doesn't hold in the near-term.

2.3.3 Exact spending schedules

Theorem 3. *Let the model described in (2.1) hold. Then, in the optimal path,*

$$\alpha_1^\eta = \frac{\lambda_1}{k_1 \cdot \exp\{(\rho - r_1)t\}} \cdot \left(\frac{1 - \lambda_1}{\lambda_1 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \right)^{(1-\lambda_1)(1-\eta)} \quad (33)$$

$$\alpha_2^{1-\delta_2} = \frac{w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 \cdot t\}}{r_1 - \gamma_1 - r_2} \cdot \delta_2 \cdot \lambda_2 \cdot \beta_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_2 t\} \cdot \left(\frac{1 - \lambda_2}{\lambda_2 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \right)^{\delta_2 \cdot (1-\lambda_2)} \quad (34)$$

where k_1 is minimized subject to the constraint that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} x_1 \geq 0$

Proof. See §B.5 □

One conclusion is that the value drift rate, (as long as it's low enough and satisfies $r_2 + \gamma_1 < r_1$, per (26)), doesn't change the growth rate of spending on movement building, but affects it as a one time multiplicative ratio.

2.4 Example values

2.4.1 Example 1. $\eta = 1.1, \gamma_1 = 0.03, \delta_2 = 0.44$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \eta = \text{Elasticity of spending} = 1.1 \\ \rho = \text{Hazard rate} = 0.005 = 0.5\% \\ r_1 = \text{Returns above inflation} = 0.06 = 6\% \\ \gamma_1 = \text{Change in participant contributions} = 0.03 = 3\% \\ \gamma_2 = \text{Change in the difficulty of recruiting} = 0.01 = 1\% \\ w_2 = \text{Average participant contribution per unit of time} = 0.5 \\ \beta_2 = \text{Constant inversely proportional to difficulty of recruiting} = 1,000 \\ \lambda_1 = \text{Coub-Douglas elasticity of direct work and direct spending} = 0.5 \\ \lambda_2 = \text{Coub-Douglas elasticity of movement building} = 0.5 \\ \delta_2 = \text{Elasticity of movement growth} = 0.44 \end{array} \right. \quad (35)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
g_{x_2} &= \frac{\gamma_2 + \delta_2 \lambda_2 \gamma_1}{1 - \delta_2} \\
&= \frac{0.01 + 0.5 \cdot 0.44 \cdot 0.03}{1 - 0.44} \\
&= 0.0296 = 2.96\%
\end{aligned} \tag{36}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
g_{\alpha_2} &= g_{\sigma_2} + g_{x_2} + \gamma_1 = 0 + g_{x_2} + \gamma_1 \\
&= 0.0296 + 0.03 \\
&= 0.0596 = 5.96\%
\end{aligned} \tag{37}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
g_{\alpha_1} &= \frac{r_1 - \rho}{\eta} - \frac{(1 - \eta)(1 - \lambda_1)}{\eta} \cdot \gamma_1 \\
&= \frac{0.06 - 0.005}{1.1} - \frac{(1 - 1.1)(1 - 0.5)}{1.1} \cdot 0.03 \\
&\approx 0.05136 = 5.136\%
\end{aligned} \tag{38}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
g_{\sigma_1} &= g_{\alpha_1} - g_{x_2} - \gamma_1 \\
&= 0.05136 - 0.0296 - 0.03 \\
&= -0.00824 = -0.824\%
\end{aligned} \tag{39}$$

2.4.2 Example 2. $\eta = 0.9, \gamma_1 = 0.03, \delta_2 = 0.44$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\eta = \text{Elasticity of spending} = 0.9 \\
\rho = \text{Hazard rate} = 0.005 = 0.5\% \\
r_1 = \text{Returns above inflation} = 0.06 = 6\% \\
\gamma_1 = \text{Change in participant contributions} = 0.03 = 3\% \\
\gamma_2 = \text{Change in the difficulty of recruiting} = 0.01 = 1\% \\
w_2 = \text{Average participant contribution per unit of time} = 0.5 \\
\beta_2 = \text{Constant inversely proportional to difficulty of recruiting} = 1,000 \\
\lambda_1 = \text{Coub-Douglas elasticity of direct work and direct spending} = 0.5 \\
\lambda_2 = \text{Coub-Douglas elasticity of movement building} = 0.5 \\
\delta_2 = \text{Elasticity of movement growth} = 0.44
\end{array} \right. \tag{40}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
g_{x_2} &= \frac{\gamma_2 + \delta_2 \lambda_2 \gamma_1}{1 - \delta_2} \\
&= \frac{0.01 + 0.5 \cdot 0.44 \cdot 0.03}{1 - 0.44} \\
&= 0.0296 = 2.96\%
\end{aligned} \tag{41}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
g_{\alpha_2} &= g_{\sigma_2} + g_{x_2} + \gamma_1 = 0 + g_{x_2} + \gamma_1 \\
&= 0.0296 + 0.03 \\
&= 0.0596 = 5.96\%
\end{aligned} \tag{42}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
g_{\alpha_1} &= \frac{r_1 - \rho}{\eta} - \frac{(1 - \eta)(1 - \lambda_1)}{\eta} \cdot \gamma_1 \\
&= \frac{0.06 - 0.005}{0.9} - \frac{(1 - 0.9)(1 - 0.5)}{0.9} \cdot 0.03 \\
&\approx 0.0594 = 5.94\%
\end{aligned} \tag{43}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
g_{\sigma_1} &= g_{\alpha_1} - g_{x_2} - \gamma_1 \\
&= 0.0594 - 0.0296 - 0.03 \\
&= -0.0002 = -0.02\%
\end{aligned} \tag{44}$$

2.4.3 Comparison with a rule of thumb allocation

Take a rule of thumb allocation, where $\sigma_1 = \sigma_2 = 0.5$, and the movement spends 1% of its capital per year, which then grows at 5% per year (i.e., $g_{\alpha_1} = g_{\alpha_2} = g_{x_1} = 0.05$).

For Example 1. ($\eta = 1.1$) Let $\lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = 0.5$, and in general let all the variables be as in the $\eta = 1.1$ example. Then for our rule of thumb allocation, the growth rate for x_2 is:

$$g_{x_2} = \gamma_2 + \delta_2 \cdot (\lambda_2 \cdot g_{\alpha_2} + (1 - \lambda_2) \cdot (g_{\sigma_2} + g_{x_2})) \tag{45}$$

$$g_{x_2} = 0.01 + 0.5 \cdot (0.5 \cdot 0.05 + 0.44 \cdot (0 + g_{x_2})) \tag{46}$$

$$g_{x_2} = 0.0288462 \approx 0.0288 \quad (47)$$

Then consider the growth of U in our rule of thumb allocation:

$$U(x, \alpha) = \frac{(\alpha_1^{\lambda_1} (\sigma_1 x_2)^{1-\lambda_1})^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} \quad (48)$$

$$g_U = (1-\eta) \cdot (\lambda_1 \cdot g_{\alpha_1} + (1-\lambda_1) \cdot (g_{\sigma_1} + g_{x_2})) \quad (49)$$

$$g_U = (1-1.1) \cdot (0.5 \cdot 0.05 + (1-0.5) \cdot (0 + 0.0288)) = -0.00394 \quad (50)$$

In contrast the growth of U in our first example is equal to:

$$g_U = (1-1.1) \cdot (0.5 \cdot 0.0594 + (1-0.5) \cdot (-0.00824 + 0.0296)) \approx -0.004038 \quad (51)$$

Note that when $\eta > 1$, the utility term is always negative, and thus a faster decrease is preferable.

For Example 2. ($\eta = 0.9$) Using the same reasoning as before, for the rule of thumb:

$$g_{x_2} \approx 0.0288 \quad (52)$$

$$g_U = (1-0.9) \cdot (0.5 \cdot 0.05 + (1-0.5) \cdot (0 + 0.0288)) = 0.00394 \quad (53)$$

In comparison, in the optimal path, the growth rate for U is:

$$g_U = (1-0.9) \cdot (0.5 \cdot 0.0594 + (1-0.5) \cdot (-0.0002 + 0.0296)) = 0.00444 \quad (54)$$

Note that when $\eta < 1$, the utility term is positive, and so higher growth in utility is preferable.

3 Numerical simulations

3.1 Setup

We can run some simulations to elucidate the short-run behaviour under the model. Details of these simulations can be found in §C. More graphs can be found in §D. To do this, we will consider the variable values in our second example, (2.4.2), in addition to:


$$\begin{aligned} r_2 &= -0.05 \\ w_2 &= 2000 \\ \beta_2 &= 0.5 \\ x_1(t_0) &= 10^{10} \\ x_2(t_0) &= 10^5 \end{aligned} \tag{55}$$

The r_2 value corresponds to a value drift (or death without replacement) rate of 5% per year. The w_2 value corresponds to a movement participant donating \$2000 per year, or 5% of a \$40,000 salary. The β_2 value corresponds to a team of five people being able to convince 5 other people a year on a 20k budget (and maintaining those they have convinced previously.) The initial values for x_1 and x_2 correspond to a \$10 billion endowment and 100k individuals broadly aligned with EA values. Further work could be done in order to determine more accurate and realistic estimates.


3.2 State variables


In this regime, the state variables, after an initial period in which labor stays roughly constant, these grow at an exponential rate:

Evolution of state variables



Evolution of state variables
(logarithmic scale)






3.3 Spending rates


Spending also grows exponentially, as per results in (2.3.3). Note that, per (2.4.2), α_1 grows at a rate of 5.94%, whereas α_2 grows at a rate of 5.96%, so eventually, α_2 will catch-up with and surpass α_1 . However, when it does so, the difference will be small enough to not be immediately apparent in a graph.

Evolution of spending



- Direct spending
- Spending on movement building


Evolution of spending
(logarithmic scale)



- Direct spending
- Spending on movement building

3.4 Allocation of labor

With regards to the allocations of labor, we observe the following:




The starting point is a nearly 100% allocation of labor towards money-making. This is caused by our model assuming that wages grow more slowly than the return rate on capital.

For the purposes of illustration, consider a social movement made exclusively of airline pilots, and suppose that their wages had been steadily declining as their profession becomes commoditized. Then the optimal allocation is for them to accumulate money at the beginning, and then transition to direct work once their profession is paid less.¹ This example is imperfect because the tension is between pilots' salaries relative to other salaries, but in our graph the tension is between the donations of money-makers and the interest rate, but the result is similar.

As time goes on, a different dynamic kicks in, and we observe:

¹This example might also apply to “Effective Altruism”, which has a great proportion of members with a background in software engineering, which currently has a reputation for being a well-paying profession but might become more commoditized in the future.



Recall the law of motion for x_2 :


$$\dot{x}_2 = r_2 x_2 + \beta_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_2 t\} \cdot (\alpha_2^{\lambda_2} \cdot (\sigma_2 x_2)^{1-\lambda_2})^{\delta_2} \quad (56)$$

Here, the best way to increase the absolute number of movement participants doing direct work turns out to be by investing into movement building. For any given growth rate in the absolute number of direct workers, g , the labor and capital inputs to movement-building term, $(\alpha_2^{\lambda_2} \cdot (\sigma_2 x_2)^{1-\lambda_2})^{\delta_2}$ has to grow at at least that rate (and a little bit more to adjust for the drift rate, r_2). In principle this could be accounted solely by a very fast growth rate on α_2 , but in actuality, as α_2 grows, $x_2 \cdot \sigma_2$ would become the limiting factor, and σ_2 ends up converging to a constant, and we obtain our Quasi-Ponzi condition:

$$\frac{\text{direct workers}}{\text{direct workers} + \text{movement-builders}} \rightarrow 0$$

We conclude this section with a close-up view of σ_2 :

Evolution of movement building
as a fraction of total labor



4 Conclusions and discussion

We have considered a stylized model of movement building in the context of social movements which aim to effect some change in the world.

In §2.2 we derived a necessary but not sufficient heuristic which might be used to check whether one is on the optimal path. Its simplest form is, per (20):²

$$\frac{\$ \text{ spent on direct work}}{\% \text{ of people doing direct work}} \cdot \frac{\% \text{ of people working on movement building}}{\$ \text{ spent on movement building}} = \text{constant}$$

In §2.3, we derived the balanced growth rates for the stylized model, and in §2.3.3 we derived the spending path, that is, the optimal amount to spend on movement building at any given time.

We also found that, for a space of plausible parameters, the optimal allocation implies an *asymptotic Ponzi* condition, where, even as the number of movement participants doing direct work grows with time in absolute terms, they converge to 0% of the total movement size, with most of the movement participants working either on earning money or in movement building.

However, when carrying out numerical simulations, we find that this asymptotic Ponzi condition is indeed asymptotic, and doesn't instantiate itself in the immediate future.

When carrying out these simulations, we find tend to find that the fraction of movement participants who do direct work grows until it reaches a peak, and then declines with time in favour of the fraction which dedicates themselves to earning money. The exact magnitude and location of this peak depends heavily on the choice of k_1 , a difficult to estimate constant, but the overall dynamic of growing and then declining doesn't. [See: appendix or section to discuss this with examples. We can also try to explain this analytically].

The fraction of those who work on movement building seems to grow slowly, until it stabilizes at around 0.5% of total movement size. Regarding movement building, crucially, per (121) we found out that the amount of money spent on movement building is, in a sense, stateless, that is, it doesn't depend on how many movement participants the social movement

²To apply this heuristic, find or estimate the four parameters at two distinct points in time. Computing the ratios should result in the same constant at both points in time

already has, but rather solely on their current recruitment costs, their expected contributions, and the rate of return of capital. We provided a graphical illustration of these dynamics in §3, for a set of plausible parameters.

We also found that the problem under consideration displays a strong proclivity to violate the transversality conditions, that is, to generate seemingly impossible results. For example, if the amount of money and manpower needed to convince someone to join a social movement is and remains much lower than the amount of money and manpower which typical members are willing to give to this movement, and if these typical members are willing to allocate that money and manpower towards movement building, the optimal solution looks like an almost instantaneous recursive loop which quickly “takes over the world.” This is the motivation for the $\delta_2 < 1$ term in (3).

Another fun type of transversality violation are the Satan’s apple scenarios, such as those in (Arntzenius et al. 2003) [3]. In these kinds of scenarios, waiting $n + 1$ years might always be strictly better than waiting n years, but waiting forever is strictly worse than waiting any finite amount. In our case, this might correspond to a situation where investing for $n + 1$ years before spending is better than investing for only n years, but where investing forever and never spending is worse than investing for any finite amount of time. Similarly, it might be the case that directing all of a movement’s resources and manpower towards movement building for n years to produce explosive movement growth, and then switching over to generating utility is only dominated by doing the same thing for $m > n$ years, but that solely concentrating on movement building forever would be suboptimal.

Now, for a range of plausible parameters this doesn’t happen, but there is also no particular reason why one can’t fall in a Satan’s apple scenario. Arntzenius et al. argue that the rational choice in such a scenario is to stick to a large finite integer and to stop at that point.

Overall, the results above are contingent on the stylized movement building model capturing enough facets of reality to be of interest, but there are many respects in which it is not exhaustive. To mention some salient omissions, we don’t consider global catastrophic or existential risks (such as runaway climate change, unaligned artificial intelligence, nuclear brinkmanship, extremely deadly global pandemics, etc.), which might lead us to consider more impatient allocations, and we also don’t here consider the interplay between philanthropists who have different rates of time discounting. Further, movement participants are assumed to be immortal. Should it then be the case that the stylized model is too far removed from reality, it may still

serve as a building blocks for later and more detailed models which take into account these and further considerations.

5 References

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Appendices

A Why adding a $x_2^{\phi_2}$ to the law of motion for x_2 produces the same qualitative behavior in the limit

Equation (69) becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} \rho\mu_2 - \dot{\mu}_2 = \mu_2 \cdot (\rho - g_{\mu_2}) &= (1 - \eta) \cdot (1 - \lambda_1) \cdot \frac{U}{x_2} \\ &+ \mu_1 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\} \cdot (1 - \sigma_1 - \sigma_2) \\ &+ \mu_2 \cdot (1 - \lambda_2) \cdot (\delta_2 + \phi_2) \cdot \frac{F_2}{x_2} \end{aligned} \quad (57)$$

which simplifies to

$$\mu_2 \cdot (\rho - g_{\mu_2}) = \mu_1 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\} \cdot \left(1 + \frac{\phi_2}{\delta_2} \cdot \sigma_2\right) \quad (58)$$

But the $\frac{\phi_2}{\delta_2} \cdot \sigma_2$ is at most a constant factor, so the balanced growth solution is the same.

B Proofs and derivations

B.1 Hamiltonian equations

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial \alpha_1} = 0$$

$$(1 - \eta) \cdot \lambda_1 \cdot \frac{U}{\alpha_1} - \mu_1 = 0 \quad (59)$$

$$\mu_1 = (1 - \eta) \lambda_1 \cdot \frac{U}{\alpha_1} \quad (60)$$

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial \alpha_2} = 0$$

$$\mu_2 \cdot \delta_2 \lambda_2 \cdot \frac{F_2}{\alpha_2} - \mu_1 = 0 \quad (61)$$

$$\mu_1 = \mu_2 \cdot \delta_2 \cdot \lambda_2 \cdot \frac{F_2}{\alpha_2} \quad (62)$$

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial \sigma_1} = 0$$

$$(1 - \eta)(1 - \lambda_1) \cdot \frac{U}{\sigma_1} - \mu_1 \cdot x_2 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\} = 0 \quad (63)$$

$$\mu_1 = \frac{(1 - \eta)(1 - \lambda_1)}{w_2} \cdot \frac{U}{\sigma_1 \cdot x_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \quad (64)$$

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial \sigma_2} = 0$$

$$- \mu_1 \cdot x_2 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\} + \mu_2 \cdot \delta_2 (1 - \lambda_2) \cdot \frac{F_2}{\sigma_2} = 0 \quad (65)$$

$$\mu_1 = \mu_2 \cdot \frac{\delta_2 \cdot (1 - \lambda_2)}{w_2} \cdot \frac{F_2}{\sigma_2 \cdot x_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \quad (66)$$

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial x_1} = \rho \mu_1 - \dot{\mu}_1$$

$$\mu_1 \cdot r_1 = \rho \mu_1 - \dot{\mu}_1 \quad (67)$$

$$\mu_1 = k_1 \cdot \exp\{(\rho - r_1)t\} \quad (68)$$

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial x_2} = \rho \mu_2 - \dot{\mu}_2$$

$$\begin{aligned} \rho \mu_2 - \dot{\mu}_2 = \mu_2 \cdot (\rho - g_{\mu_2}) &= (1 - \eta) \cdot (1 - \lambda_1) \cdot \frac{U}{x_2} \\ &+ \mu_1 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\} \cdot (1 - \sigma_1 - \sigma_2) \\ &+ \mu_2 \cdot \left(r_2 + (1 - \lambda_2) \cdot \delta_2 \cdot \frac{F_2}{x_2} \right) \end{aligned} \quad (69)$$

Through several manipulations of (69), in particular by substituting $(1 - \eta) \cdot (1 - \lambda_1) \cdot U$ from (64) and $(1 - \lambda_1) \cdot \delta_2 \cdot F_2 \cdot \mu_2$ from (66), we arrive at:

$$\mu_2 \cdot (\rho - g_{\mu_2} - r_2) = \mu_1 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\} \quad (70)$$

This produces the growth equation

$$g_{\mu_1} = g_{\mu_2} + g_{x_2} - \gamma_1 \quad (71)$$

Summary

$$\mu_1 = (1 - \eta)\lambda_1 \cdot \frac{U}{\alpha_1} \quad (72)$$

$$\mu_1 = \mu_2 \cdot \delta_2 \cdot \lambda_2 \cdot \frac{F_2}{\alpha_2} \quad (73)$$

$$\mu_1 = \frac{(1 - \eta)(1 - \lambda_1)}{w_2} \cdot \frac{U}{\sigma_1 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \quad (74)$$

$$\mu_1 = \mu_2 \cdot \frac{\delta_2 \cdot (1 - \lambda_2)}{w_2} \cdot \frac{F_2}{\sigma_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \quad (75)$$

$$\mu_1 = k_1 \cdot \exp\{(\rho - r_1)t\} \quad (76)$$

$$\mu_2 \cdot (\rho - g_{\mu_2} - r_2) = \mu_1 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\} \quad (77)$$

B.2 Balanced growth equations

This last equation, (83) comes from $F_2 = \dot{x}_2 - r_2 x_2$. In the balanced growth path, $\dot{x}_2 = g_{x_2} \cdot x_2$, so $F_2 = g_{x_2} \cdot x_2 - r_2 x_2 = (g_{x_2} - r_2) \cdot x_2$.

$$g_{\mu_1} = g_U - g_{\alpha_1} \quad (78)$$

$$g_{\mu_1} = g_{\mu_2} + g_{F_2} - g_{\alpha_2} \quad (79)$$

$$g_{\mu_1} = g_U - g_{\sigma_1} - g_{x_2} - \gamma_1 \quad (80)$$

$$g_{\mu_1} = g_{\mu_2} + g_{F_2} - g_{\sigma_2} - g_{x_2} - \gamma_1 \quad (81)$$

$$g_{\mu_1} = (\rho - r_1) \quad (82)$$

$$g_{\mu_1} = g_{\mu_2} - \gamma_1 \quad (83)$$

$$g_{x_2} = g_{F_2} = \gamma_2 + \delta_2 \cdot \left(\lambda_2 \cdot g_{\alpha_2} + (1 - \lambda_2) \cdot (g_{\sigma_2} + g_{x_2}) \right) \quad (84)$$

Some simple simplifications follow. (90) is derived from (81) + (83) + ($g_{x_2} = g_{F_2}$).

$$g_{\alpha_1} = g_{\sigma_1} + g_{x_2} + \gamma_1 \quad (85)$$

$$g_{\mu_1} = g_U - g_{\alpha_1} \quad (86)$$

$$g_{\alpha_2} = g_{\sigma_2} + g_{x_2} + \gamma_1 \quad (87)$$

$$g_{\mu_1} = g_{\mu_2} + g_{F_2} - g_{\alpha_2} \quad (88)$$

$$g_{\mu_1} = \rho - r_1 \quad (89)$$

$$g_{\sigma_2} = 0 \quad (90)$$

$$g_{x_2} = g_{F_2} = \gamma_2 + \delta_2 \cdot \left(\lambda_2 \cdot g_{\alpha_2} + (1 - \lambda_2) \cdot (g_{\sigma_2} + g_{x_2}) \right) \quad (91)$$

B.3 Balanced growth path derivation

From this we can simply derive g_{x_2} , by substituting (87) and (90) in (91)

$$g_{x_2} = \frac{\gamma_2 + \delta_2 \lambda_2 \gamma_1}{1 - \delta_2} \quad (92)$$

And from that g_{α_2} , by substituting (92) back in (87)

$$g_{\alpha_2} = g_{x_2} + \gamma_1 = \frac{\gamma_2 + \delta_2 \lambda_2 \gamma_1}{1 - \delta_2} + \gamma_1 \quad (93)$$

Similarly, from (85), (86) and (92), we can derive g_{α_1} and g_{σ_1} :

$$g_{\alpha_1} = \frac{r_1 - \rho}{\eta} - \frac{(1 - \eta)(1 - \lambda_1)}{\eta} \cdot \gamma_1 \quad (94)$$

$$g_{\sigma_1} = \frac{r - \rho}{\eta} - \left(\frac{(1 - \eta)(1 - \lambda_1)}{\eta} + 1 \right) \cdot \gamma_1 - g_{x_2} \quad (95)$$

Note that this solution is only valid where $g_{\sigma_1} \leq 0$.

Note also that $g_{\alpha_1} \leq g_{\alpha_2}$. Proof: $g_{\alpha_1} = g_{\sigma_1} + g_{x_2} + \gamma_1$, and $g_{\alpha_2} = g_{\sigma_2} + g_{x_2} + \gamma_1$. Hence $g_{\alpha_1} = g_{\sigma_1} + g_{\alpha_2} \wedge g_{\sigma_1} \leq 0 \implies g_{\alpha_1} \leq g_{\alpha_2}$.

We can also derive x_1 .

$$\dot{x}_1 = r_1 x_1 - \alpha_1 - \alpha_2 + x_2 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\} \cdot (1 - \sigma_1 - \sigma_2) \quad (96)$$

$$x_1 = a \cdot \exp\{r_1 \cdot t\} + b \cdot \exp\{g_{\alpha_1} \cdot t\} + c \cdot \exp\{g_{\alpha_2} \cdot t\} \quad (97)$$

B.4 Checking the transversality condition

The variables we need follow. We get μ_2 from (81) + ($g_{F_2} = g_{x_2}$) + ($g_{\sigma_2} = 0$)

$$\mu_1 = k_1 \cdot \exp\{(\rho - r_1) \cdot t\} \quad (98)$$

$$\mu_2 = k_2 \cdot \exp\left\{ \left((\rho - r_1) + \gamma_1 \right) \cdot t \right\} \quad (99)$$

$$x_1 = a \cdot \exp\{r_1 \cdot t\} + b \cdot \exp\{g_{\alpha_1} \cdot t\} + c \cdot \exp\{g_{\alpha_2} \cdot t\} \quad (100)$$

$$x_2 = \exp\left\{ \frac{\gamma_2 + \delta_2 \lambda_2 \gamma_1}{1 - \delta_2} \cdot t \right\} \quad (101)$$

The transversality condition is

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \exp\{-\rho \cdot t\} \cdot x_i \cdot \mu_i = 0 \quad (102)$$

For $i = 1$, this implies $a = 0$, $g_{\alpha_1} < r_1$, $g_{\alpha_2} < r_1$. For $\rho \approx 0.005$, $\gamma_1 \approx 0.05$, $\gamma_2 \approx 0.01$, $r_1 \approx 0.06$, $\lambda_1 \approx 0.5$, this implies $\eta \gtrsim 0.86$.

For $i = 3$, the transversality condition is satisfied when:

$$-\rho + (\rho - r_1 + \gamma_1) + \frac{\gamma_2 + \delta_2 \cdot \lambda_2 \cdot \gamma_1}{1 - \delta_2} < 0 \quad (103)$$

i.e.,

$$\gamma_1 + \frac{\gamma_2 + \delta_2 \cdot \lambda_2 \cdot \gamma_1}{1 - \delta_2} < r_1 \quad (104)$$

or, alternatively,

$$g_{\alpha_2} = gx_1 + \gamma_1 < r_1 \quad (105)$$

For $\lambda_2 \approx 0.5, r_1 \approx 0.06, \gamma_1 \approx 0.03, \gamma_2 \approx 0.01$, this implies that either $\delta_2 \lesssim 0.44$ or $1 < \delta_2$. For $\gamma_1 \approx 0.02$, this changes to $-1 < \delta_2 \lesssim 0.6$ or $1 < \delta_2$.

Further, (70) implies $\rho - g_{x_2} - r_2 > 0$, i.e., $r_2 + \gamma_1 < r_1$; otherwise the first term in the equality in (70) would be negative and the second one positive. We will see in (121) that r_2 , the movement drift rate, increases the initial value of α_2 , but not its growth rate. Still, $r_2 + \gamma_1 < r_1$ allows only for a pretty low drift rate.

B.5 Exact spending schedules

In this section, through the previous equations, we derive a more or less explicit formula for α_1 and α_2 . Using that, determine the form of σ_1 and σ_2 , and having these, we derive the instantaneous change in x_1 and x_2 , and this is already enough for numerical simulations.

To derive α_1 , we will make use of the following equations: (72), (76) and (9)

$$\mu_1 = (1 - \eta)\lambda_1 \cdot \frac{U}{\alpha_1} \quad (106)$$

$$\mu_1 = k_1 \cdot \exp\{(\rho - r_1)t\} \quad (107)$$

$$\frac{\lambda_1}{\alpha_1} = \frac{1 - \lambda_1}{\sigma_1 \cdot x_2 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \quad (108)$$

Expanding the full form of U per (2) on (106):

$$\mu_1 = \lambda_1 \cdot \frac{(\alpha_1^{\lambda_1} (\sigma_1 x_2)^{1-\lambda_1})^{1-\eta}}{\alpha_1} \quad (109)$$

and replacing $\sigma_1 \cdot x_2$ on (108) from (107):

$$\mu_1 = \lambda_1 \cdot \frac{\left(\alpha_1^{\lambda_1} \cdot \left(\frac{1 - \lambda_1}{\lambda_1} \cdot \frac{\alpha_1}{w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \right)^{1 - \lambda_1} \right)^{1 - \eta}}{\alpha_1} \quad (110)$$

$$\mu_1 = \lambda_1 \cdot \frac{\alpha_1^{(1 - \eta)}}{\alpha_1} \cdot \left(\frac{1 - \lambda_1}{\lambda_1 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \right)^{(1 - \lambda_1)(1 - \eta)} \quad (111)$$

$$\alpha_1^\eta = \frac{\lambda_1}{\mu_1} \cdot \left(\frac{1 - \lambda_1}{\lambda_1 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \right)^{(1 - \lambda_1)(1 - \eta)} \quad (112)$$

$$\alpha_1^\eta = \frac{\lambda_1}{k_1 \cdot \exp\{(\rho - r_1)t\}} \cdot \left(\frac{1 - \lambda_1}{\lambda_1 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \right)^{(1 - \lambda_1)(1 - \eta)} \quad (113)$$

Note how this is consistent with (94):

$$g_{\alpha_1} = \frac{r_1 - \rho}{\eta} - \frac{(1 - \eta)(1 - \lambda_1)}{\eta} \cdot \gamma_1 \quad (114)$$

Now, if k_1 is too small, then α_1 becomes so large that $x_1 \rightarrow -\infty$. Conversely, if k_1 is too large, then α_1 is too small and we accumulate money we are never to spend. k_1 will be then uniquely determined by being the value such that neither of those conditions hold.

We can derive α_2 in a similar manner, starting from (73), (10) and (77)

$$\mu_1 = \mu_2 \cdot \delta_2 \cdot \lambda_2 \cdot \frac{F_2}{\alpha_2} \quad (115)$$

$$\frac{\lambda_2}{\alpha_2} = \frac{1 - \lambda_2}{\sigma_2 \cdot x_2 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \quad (116)$$

$$\mu_2 \cdot (\rho - g_{\mu_2} - r_2) = \mu_1 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\} \quad (117)$$

We expand F_2 on (115) per (3) and divide by μ_2 :

$$\frac{\mu_1}{\mu_2} = \delta_2 \cdot \lambda_2 \cdot \frac{\beta_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_2 t\} \cdot (\alpha_2^{\lambda_2} \cdot (\sigma_2 x_2)^{1 - \lambda_2})^{\delta_2}}{\alpha_2} \quad (118)$$

We simplify μ_1/μ_2 per (117), replace $\sigma_1 x_2$ per (116), and substitute $g_{\mu_2} = \rho - r_1 + \gamma_1$

$$\frac{\rho - g_{\mu_2} - r_2}{w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 \cdot t\}} = \delta_2 \cdot \lambda_2 \cdot \beta_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_2 t\} \cdot \frac{\left(\alpha_2^{\lambda_2} \cdot \left(\frac{1 - \lambda_2}{\lambda_2} \cdot \frac{\alpha_2}{w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \right)^{1 - \lambda_2} \right)^{\delta_2}}{\alpha_2} \quad (119)$$

$$\frac{\rho - (\rho - r_1 + \gamma_1) - r_2}{w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 \cdot t\}} = \delta_2 \cdot \lambda_2 \cdot \beta_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_2 t\} \cdot \frac{\alpha_2^{\delta_2}}{\alpha_2} \cdot \left(\frac{1 - \lambda_2}{\lambda_2 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \right)^{\delta_2 \cdot (1 - \lambda_2)} \quad (120)$$

$$\alpha_2^{1 - \delta_2} = \frac{w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 \cdot t\}}{r_1 - \gamma_1 - r_2} \cdot \delta_2 \cdot \lambda_2 \cdot \beta_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_2 t\} \cdot \left(\frac{1 - \lambda_2}{\lambda_2 \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t\}} \right)^{\delta_2 \cdot (1 - \lambda_2)} \quad (121)$$

C Numerical simulation details

We have determined the value of α_i at all times (up to a constant k_1), as well as α_2 . Now suppose we knew x_1 and x_2 at some point, for example at the present time t_0 , i.e., $x_1(t_0), x_2(t_0)$. Then, we could also figure out $\sigma_i(t_0)$, per (9) and (10):

$$\sigma_i(t_0) = \frac{1 - \lambda_i}{\lambda_i} \cdot \frac{\alpha_i(t_0)}{x_2(t_0) \cdot w_2 \cdot \exp\{\gamma_1 t_0\}} \quad (122)$$

Using $\alpha_1(t_0), \alpha_2(t_0), \sigma_1(t_0), \sigma_2(t_0), x_1(t_0), x_2(t_0)$ we can approximate the derivative, or instantaneous change of the state variables, $\dot{x}_1(t_0), \dot{x}_2(t_0)$ per their law of motion (3), and then approximate $x_i(t_0 \pm \epsilon) = x_i(t_0) \pm \epsilon \cdot \dot{x}_i(t_0)$. Our general approach to generate numerical approximations will be to use this approximation.

The method in which we start with the values at some initial point in time and then extrapolate them into the future is known as forward shooting. In contrast, the method in which we try to guess some final points in the future which, when extrapolated into the past hit our initial conditions is known as reverse shooting. Reverse shooting is known for being more stable, but in practice we don't notice much of a difference.

The code, in R, is based on previous Matlab code by Leopold Aschenbrenner, whose code is itself based on code by Charles Jones. Aschenbrenner's code can be found in [this online repository](#)

This code makes use of the variable values from our second example scenario in (2.4.2)

$$\begin{aligned}
 \eta &= 0.9 \\
 \rho &= 0.005 \\
 r_1 &= 0.06 \\
 \gamma_1 &= 0.03 \\
 \gamma_2 &= 0.01 \\
 \lambda_1 &= 0.5 \\
 \lambda_2 &= 0.5 \\
 \delta_2 &= 0.44
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{123}$$

To which we add r_2 , which is negative because it represents a value-drift or drop-out rate (as opposed to, say, a fertility rate).

$$r_2 = -0.05 \tag{124}$$

and β_2, w_2 .

$$\begin{aligned}
 w_2 &= 2000 \\
 \beta_2 &= 0.5
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{125}$$

These factors correspond to each movement participant donating \$2000 per year, or 5% of a \$40,000 salary, and a team of five people being able to convince 5 other people a year on a 20k budget (and maintaining those they have convinced previously.) Further work could be done in order to determine more accurate and realistic estimates. We also consider initial conditions:

$$x_1(t_0) = \mathbf{x_1_init} = 10^{10} \tag{126}$$

$$x_2(t_0) = \mathbf{x_2_init} = 10^5 \tag{127}$$

We also consider two parameters, corresponding to our unknown constant k_1 : `k1_forward_shooting` and `k1_reverse_shooting`. They determine spending on direct work. Their value is such that decreasing it results in too little spending, and the movement accumulates money which is never spent. Conversely, increasing it results in the movement going bankrupt and acquiring infinite debt. However, its value is inexact, and will be a source of error. In particular, if we run simulations until time t , we don't know that the movement will not go bankrupt at some subsequent time, and hence k_1 requires some guesswork. More specifically, if we select the maximum k_1 such that x_1 is positive at time t , we tend to find that $x_1 \rightarrow -\infty$ shortly afterwards.

```
k1_forward_shooting = 3*10^(-7)
k1_reverse_shooting = 3*10^(-7)
```

Finally, we decide on a step-size and on a time interval. The time interval will start at 100 years, and increase to 1,000 and then 10,000 years.


```
stepsize = 0.1
first = 0
last = 100
times_forward_shooting = seq(from=first, to=last, by=stepsize)
times_reverse_shooting = seq(from=last, to=first, by=-stepsize)
```

D Additional graphs


D.1 Graphical results: 100 years

For the first hundred years, accumulated money and movement size grow at different exponential rates. The allocation of participants is primarily to money-making, though both the allocations of movement participants to direct work and to movement building initially increase exponentially, with the former doing so at a much higher rate. Spending also increases in absolute terms for both direct work and movement building (per (2.3.3)).


Evolution of state variables




Evolution of state variables
(logarithmic scale)




Evolution of movement size




Evolution of labor fractions




Evolution of labor fractions
(only direct work and movement building)




Evolution of movement building
as a fraction of total labor




Evolution of direct work
as a fraction of labor
(logarithmic scale)



Evolution of movement building
as a fraction of labor
(logarithmic scale)




Evolution of labor
in absolute terms




Evolution of movement participants
in absolute terms

(only direct workers and movement builders)





Evolution of movement participants in absolute terms (logarithmic scale)

(only direct workers and movement builders)



Evolution of spending







D.2 Graphical results: 1,000 years

The dynamic for the state and spending variables is mostly as in the previous section. With regards to movement size and distribution, movement building as a fraction of movement size plateaus at around 0.65%, and stays there. Direct work reaches 40%, and starts slowly declining, whereas money-making starts increasing back-up once again.


Evolution of state variables




Evolution of state variables
(logarithmic scale)





Evolution of movement size




Evolution of labor fractions






Evolution of labor
in absolute terms




Evolution of movement participants
in absolute terms

(only direct workers and movement builders)





Evolution of movement participants in absolute terms (logarithmic scale)

(only direct workers and movement builders)



Evolution of spending







D.3 Graphical results: 10,000 years

Direct work as a fraction of movement size continues to decrease, perhaps exponentially, but doesn't yet go below movement building. However, we know from the balanced growth rates that it will do so. We can't display some of the graphs on a non-logarithmic scale due to large number limitations in R. [and I'm having some limitations in pushing forward the simulation much beyond 10k years]


Evolution of state variables




Evolution of state variables
(logarithmic scale)




Evolution of movement size




Evolution of labor fractions




Evolution of labor fractions
(only direct work and movement building)




Evolution of direct work
as a fraction of total labor




Evolution of movement building
as a fraction of total labor




Evolution of direct work
as a fraction of labor
(logarithmic scale)




Evolution of direct work
as a fraction of labor
(logarithmic scale)



Evolution of movement building
as a fraction of labor
(logarithmic scale)




Evolution of labor
in absolute terms




Evolution of movement participants
in absolute terms

(only direct workers and movement builders)



Evolution of movement participants in absolute terms (logarithmic scale)

(only direct workers and movement builders)



Evolution of spending (logarithmic scale)

