72 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
72 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
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# Artificial Intelligence texts I've read
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In no particular order. Recuerda que probablemente tengas notas más extensas por algún sitio.
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La mayoría extraídos de https://aisafety.com/reading-group/ o https://agentfoundations.org/
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*Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgement of Global Risks*, Eliezer Yudkowsky
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*An AI Race for Strategic Advantage: Rhetoric and Risks*, Sean S.
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*Artificial Intelligence and Its Implications for Future Suffering*, Brian Tomasik
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This guy is a negative utilitarian.
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Is MIRI's work too theoretical? In maths, you can take the supremum of an uncountably infinite set, which you can't do in practice.
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If you have an uncountably infinite number of events, only up to a countably infinite number of them can have nonzero probabilities.
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*Impossibility of deducing preferences and rationality from human policy*, Stuart Amstrong
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Too theoretical. In particular, why should I care about maximum regret?
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*Refuting Bostrom's Superintelligence Argument*, Sebastian Benthal
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Improving a Bayesian prediction function may have too high a recalcitrance
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|N: I don't really agree. Being able to discriminate between +-0.1db of evidence is probably already a superpower
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*There is no fire alarm for AI*, Yudkowsky
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*Superintelligence*, Nick Bostrom
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*Intelligence Explosion FAQ*, Luke Muehlhauser
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*Intelligence Explosion Macroeconomics*. Yudkowsky
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*Strategic Implications of Openness in AI development*, Nick Bostrom
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*That Alien Message*, Eliezer Yudkowsky
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*The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence*, Bostrom and Yudkowsky
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*Problem Class Dominance in Predictive Dilemmas*, Daniel Hintze
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*Timeless Decision Theory*, Yudkowsky
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